(Solved): Q1 Second-price, sealed-bid auction I 3 Points There are 3 buyers bidding for one item in a second ...

Q1 Second-price, sealed-bid auction I 3 Points There are 3 buyers bidding for one item in a second-price, sealed-bid auction. Assume that buyer valuations follow a uniform \( (0,1) \) distribution. Suppose that the valuations of the 3 buyers are: \[ \begin{array}{l} v_{1}=0.3827 \\ v_{2}=0.9679 \\ v_{3}=0.7620 \end{array} \] Assume that each buyer bids according to the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy. Round all numeric answers to at least three decimals. Q1.1 1 Point Which buyer wins the auction? 1 2 3 Q1.2 1 Point What price does the winning bidder pay? (Note that this equals the revenue that the seller receives.) Round your answer to at least three decimal places. Q1.3 1 Point What surplus does the winning bidder receive? Round your answer to at least three decimal places.